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“A man who carries a cat by the tail learns something he can learn in no other way.” 
--Mark Twain 
 
Decision makers learn from experience and this learning affects their future decisions.  But how?  
Using game theory, the authors explore how people factor in the payoffs of past decisions in their 
current choices.  The authors introduce the concept of experience-weighted attraction (EWA) to 
explain how people learn from their experience. Sophisticated players can use this concept to learn 
which strategies work and “outguess” their rivals. And by understanding how rivals and customers 
learn, managers can take actions that “teach” rivals and customers what you want them to 
believe— reassuring partners and intimidating competitors.  
 
Every decision is influenced by learning. The price a firm bids in a B2B auction, a 
complicated wage-bonus package offered to an executive, and the scale of investment in new 
business are all influenced by what has worked in the past.  Airlines have struggled for years to 
coordinate industry-wide pricing practices, effectively teaching one another to stabilize fares and 
keep airplanes full, while skirting laws against explicit collusion. Firms figure out how to balance 
risky portions of compensation packages (such as options and company stock) with fixed salary 
portions, to both motivate employees and keep them happy during a stock market downturn. 
Internet buyers clicking through Websites use trial-and-error-learning to figure out how to get what 
they want from the web site. Firms also try to teach customers through advertising, service 
experiences, and so forth.  
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Understanding how customers learn is invaluable for evaluating marketing strategies.  
Understanding how rivals learn is crucial for developing competitive strategies. How do managers 
learn from their own experiences and from one another to make these decisions? How can they 
effectively teach customers and rivals to affect their decisions? 
 
THEORIES OF LEARNING 
Learning is a change in behavior based on experience. How do managers learn? According 
to economic theories, idealized decision makers run through complicated calculations to derive an 
optimal decision. But in practice people typically learn by trial and error. Firms try out a group 
bonus scheme one year, and abandon it if productivity does not  improve. Construction companies 
bid on contracts and learn to build in expected cost overruns after losing money. Firms learn that 
hiring friends referred by current employees improves morale and productivity, and reduces 
turnover; so they increase their inside-hiring bonus from $1,000 to $5,000.  Financial markets learn, 
cyclically, whether initial public offerings (IPOs) are good investments or not. And consumer 
products companies learn whether a successful yogurt brand name can be used to umbrella-brand 
ice cream, chocolate, or pudding.  
In all these cases, not only are people and firms learning how to do better, but what they are 
learning depends upon what others--consumers, competitors, regulators--are doing. 
There are three primary theories of how this kind of interactive learning takes place: 
 
• Reinforcement: From the 1920s to the 1960s psychologists asserted that the primary way 
animals and people learn is by reinforcement. If actions are positively reinforced, they are taken 
again; if they are negatively reinforced, they are not taken again.  Reinforcement is undeniably 
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important, especially for learning by animals and children, and for certain kinds of human 
learning which derive from the “old” part of the brain (e.g., learning what to fear, and 
developing drug addictions). But later research in psychology showed that humans—and even 
pigeons-- are sensitive to whether actions they did not take would have yielded positive 
reinforcements.  Reinforcement theory omitted this kind of learning from the road not taken.  
 
• Belief learning:  Beginning in the 1950s, learning theorists proposed that managers learn by 
developing a precise guess (or belief) about what other managers will do, based on observations 
of the past actions of those managers. Then managers choose a strategy that will yield a good 
payoff if their belief proves to be right.  
 
• Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA): Experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning 
theory improves upon these two leading theories by combining their key features.  It is based on 
the concept that strategic choices have different “attractions” for managers (as reflected in a 
numerical value), based on past experience.  The EWA theory is embodied in a mathematical 
model1, which is beyond the scope of this chapter, but we will highlight its key features.2  
 
The concept of attraction incorporates both the extra reinforcement based on a manager’s 
firsthand experience and the beliefs about the actions of others.3 The way in which attractions are 
adjusted to reflect learning is based upon three factors: consideration, change and commitment, as 
discussed in more detail below.  
 The EWA, reinforcement and belief theories have been compared in 31 separate sets of data 
from experiments (conducted by us, as well as six other researchers). In 90 percent of those studies, 
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EWA explained and predicted what people actually chose more accurately than either of the other 
theories. Experiments also show that players achieve higher payoffs by using the EWA model to 
forecast the strategic behaviors of others.4 For example, in one study 43 of 54 players using EWA 
earned more money than counterparts not using this approach.  
 
Learning Styles: Consideration, Change, and Commitment 
 Different managers learn from their experiences in different ways.  These different learning 
styles – and the attraction levels assigned to different strategies – are based on three factors: 
Consideration, change, and commitment. 
 
Consideration Index 
People hate missing a plane by five minutes more than they hate missing it by an hour, 
because they can more easily imagine ways they would have caught the plane; consideration of a 
missed opportunity is far stronger for a near miss.  In the EWA theory, the consideration index is a 
measure of the relative weight people give to foregone payoffs in past decisions, or how vividly 
they imagine lost value from missed opportunities. If their imagination is hazy, lost value does not 
weigh very heavily in learning. If, however, there is powerful emotional regret, as when the 
passenger is standing at the gate watching the plane taxi onto the runway (or a competitor lands a 
big account you spent months wooing), consideration will be a much more significant factor in 
learning.   
 Consideration of lost opportunities is also embedded in legal principles such as negligence. 
In an accident, the party who had the "last clear chance" to avert the accident is usually held liable, 
because it is easiest to imagine the accident being avoided by that party's last-second action. 
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Economists often refer to the value of a lost opportunity as an “opportunity cost.” When the 
consideration index is higher, managers switch more quickly to the strategies they wish they would 
have picked, minimizing their opportunity cost or regret.  
Smart learners have a high consideration index, which means they are actively considering 
what they should have done after every move. Learners with a low consideration index can get 
stuck using a strategy that is not necessarily bad, but is not nearly as good as alternative strategies.5  
In artificial intelligence programs that help machines to learn, clever programmers avoid getting 
stuck with suboptimal outcomes by having the machine experiment periodically.  
 
Change Index 
The second factor that affects the attraction of past strategies is the manager’s perception of 
how rapidly the environment is changing. When change is rapid, players attach little weight to old 
experiences, because what worked years ago (or months, in internet time) is irrelevant.  When the 
environment is stable, managers can learn over longer periods, weighing previous successes and 
failures equally. In this case, managers can use a long history of payoffs to choose a strategy.  
In learning, information is like machinery. The change index determines the obsolescence 
policy for disposing of old information, much as companies develop obsolescence policies for 
replacing old equipment. When technology quickly makes machinery obsolete, managers retire old 
machinery and upgrade quickly; when obsolescence is slow, they hold onto old machinery longer. 
When the world is changing rapidly, you should “retire” past experience more rapidly. This advice 
implies that different businesses in a single firm should be learning at different rates.  Think of a 
restaurant that begins to advertise and accept reservations on its website.  Learning about how to 
operate the website requires very rapid adjustment and learning (which implies forgetting about 
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what worked a year or two ago). But knowing how to train waitstaff and buy fresh produce and 
seafood benefits from the wisdom of many years of experience.  
  
Commitment Index 
The third factor that affects learning is how quickly managers lock in on a strategy that has 
performed well. If, for example, a given strategy has produced consistently high payoffs, and the 
environment is relatively stable, then it makes sense to commit to choose that strategy all the time.  
But if the relative performance of strategies seesaws back and forth, and the environment is 
changing rapidly, then it is a mistake to commit too strongly to one strategy.  
In the EWA theory, commitment is expressed by judging a strategy based on its cumulative 
performance, simply totalling up all its successes. If attractions are cumulative payoff totals, then a 
strategy which is good enough to be chosen often will pile up more and more wins, compared to 
lesser strategies which are not tried much. This process is like the opposite of handicapping a horse 
race.  To make a horse race even, the best horses are forced to carry more weight to slow them 
down.  But suppose you wanted to guarantee that the best horse wins. Then you would want to give 
less weight to the fastest horses, to give them an advantage based on previous successes.  Similarly, 
suppose you were deciding which scientist in your R&D lab to devote resources to.  During an 
initial trial period, you might judge new scientists by their average output.  Then it makes sense to 
commit more resources to the scientists who did well initially, and judge scientists by their total 
output.  
 The EWA theory specifies a precise mathematical way in which past experiences are 
combined using the consideration, change, and commitment indices.  These indices correspond to 
different learning styles.  For example, a manager who is constantly second-guessing and pointing 
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out mistakes has a high consideration index (which is good for learning, but may have other 
organizational costs such as demoralizing workers and discouraging risk-taking). A manager who 
always surfs the latest trend has a high change index; one whose mantra is “if it ain’t broke don’t 
fix it” has a low change index.  
  
SOPHISTICATED LEARNING 
 Sophisticated players are aware of the learning process. They use an understanding of how 
others learn– and the factors of consideration, change and commitment – to anticipate the decisions 
of their competitors. Even if they don’t apply the formal EWA model in their decision making, they 
use this deeper understanding to outguess their competitors and coordinate with partners. 
 All decision makers become more sophisticated over time. In our experimental studies we 
find that a small fraction of players are sophisticated learners, but that fraction grows as subjects 
play similar games repeatedly. They learn about how to play better and also to anticipate how 
others are reacting and learning.  
 How does the presence of sophisticated players affect competitive interactions and 
outcomes?  To explore this issue, we examine a well-known competitive game – the beauty contest. 
 
Beauty Contest Games 
Economist John Maynard Keynes once compared investment in the stock market to a kind 
of beauty contest popular in British newspapers in the 1920s.6 In these contests, a newspaper 
printed pictures of 100 people and asked readers to name their favorites.  All those who chose the 
face that proved to be most popular were eligible for a prize. Keynes pointed out that the goal was 
not to pick what you considered to be the prettiest face, but to pick the face that the most people 
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would pick.  He noted that stock market investment is similar--just substitute “hottest stock next 
week” for “prettiest face.”  While Keynes' metaphor is nearly 80 years old, it is perhaps no more 
apt than in the modern-day era of tech stocks valued by "new paradigm" principles.  
 Based on this idea, researchers have developed a type of competitive game called the 
“beauty contest.” The game has been studied on three continents with several samples  
of sophisticated adults, including economics Ph.D.'s, CEOs and corporate presidents,7 and readers 
of  business publications including The Financial Times.8 It illustrates some important properties of 
strategic thinking in naturally occurring settings.  
 In the beauty contest game we analyze below, a group of players simultaneously choose 
numbers between 0 and 100. The player whose number is closest to two-thirds of  the average wins 
a fixed prize. Since all players should choose two-thirds of what they think the average number will 
be,  any kind of introspective reasoning will lead to lower and lower numbers.  A typical player 
might reason as follows: Suppose the average is 50. Then I should choose 33. But if everybody 
does that first step of reasoning, then the average will be 33; so I should choose two-thirds of that, 
which is around 22.  But if everyone chooses 22, should I choose two-thirds of 22? Where does this 
thinking stop?  
 In standard game theory, there is no natural stopping place until one reaches the “Nash 
equilibrium,” the point at which all players' strategies are profit-maximizing best responses to one 
another.  In this case, the Nash equilibrium is zero. This assumes all the players are acting 
rationally, according to the dictates of game theory.  
 In practice, however, everyone is not rational, nor do we expect them to be. Some might be 
confused and choose around 50, or just choose a lucky number. Others will do one step of 
reasoning and pick 33. Others will do two steps and come down to 22.  The number of levels of 
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reasoning people are likely to use is a question that can only be answered by psychology and 
observation, rather than by pure mathematics. (The early game theorist Tom Schelling said that 
many questions in game theory cannot be answered by pure logic. Those questions can only be 
resolved by putting people in strategic situations and watching what they do, much as you cannot 
prove a joke is funny until you tell it and people laugh.)  Furthermore, a smart player's goal in the 
game is to be one step smarter than the average person, but no smarter! 
 In fact, experiments on the beauty contest game have shown a surprising amount of 
regularity.  Figure 9.1 shows some distributions of choices from four interesting groups of subjects.  
Each interval is a range of five numbers (1-5, 6-10, and so forth).  The height of each bar represents 
the proportion of subjects choosing numbers in that interval.  It is easy to see that initial choices are 
widely dispersed and centered  somewhere between equilibrium (in this case, 0) and 50. The 
average tends to be between 20 and 35, so that choosing a number between 14 and 25 would give 
you a better-than-average chance of winning. These numbers correspond to one or two steps of 
reasoning from the presumed average of 50. In fact, about a dozen experimental studies have 
shown, with very different strategic situations and different subjects, that people typically engage in 
one to two steps of reasoning.  One group of subjects are Caltech undergraduates, who have 
spectacular analytical skill (and know that their peers do too); they choose numbers about one step 
closer to the equilibrium than the other groups-- CEOs, portfolio managers, and economics Ph.D.'s. 
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 Players learn as they continue to play.  When the game is repeated, numbers gradually 
converge toward the equilibrium prediction of zero. That prediction is useful as a long-run 
benchmark, but it is not very helpful for explaining the trajectory of learning or for giving advice 
on how to play in the first few periods.   Fortunes can be made and lost getting to equilibrium. 
 What happens when sophisticated players enter these games? In any given game, some 
players are very sophisticated and others are not.  The sophisticated players understand the learning 
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Figure 9.1c: CEOs
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Figure 9.1b: Econ PhDs
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Figure 9.1a: Portfolio Managers
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process. Suppose the average in one period is 30, so that choosing 21 would have been a winning 
number. In the next period, most players tend to choose 21, but sophisticated players guess others 
will choose 21 and choose 70 percent of 21, around 15, leapfrogging ahead.  (In the internet 
economy, for example, the trick is not to be one step ahead of the competition, but always planning 
for the next step after that one.) The more sophisticated the players, the more rapidly the group will 
converge toward the equilibrium point of zero.  But what is important is that the sophisticated 
players will lower their number if they believe other players are unsophisticated.  Remember, they 
are trying to anticipate how others will act.  For example, if these sophisticated players could 
actually use the EWA model to predict every player’s choice in every period, they would know 
how to make better choices and would win more often. 
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Figure 9.2a: Actual choice frequencies in beauty contest game
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Figure 9.2b: Predictions of EWA theory in beauty contest games
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 Figure 9.2a shows the distribution of actual choices by subjects who played the game 10 
times. The axis on the front left shows intervals of numbers players might pick.  The right axis is 
the period of the game (from 1 to 10). The proportion of players choosing lower numbers grows 
and grows across the 10 repetitions-- that is, the bars representing low-number choices grow taller 
and taller-- as they learn.  Figure 9.2b shows statistical predictions of the EWA theory (that is, what 
players are predicted to do). The two graphs look very similar, which means that the theory is doing 
a good job of predicting how players will actually learn.  
 
 
 
STRATEGIC TEACHING 
This same process used by managers to learn from past experience can also be used to teach 
rivals and customers. If a sophisticated player thinks other players are adaptive, and will respond to 
their recent experiences, it can then shape those experiences to its own advantage.  The 
sophisticated player has an incentive to choose strategies in the current period that affect how the 
adaptive players respond in future periods, if those responses benefit the sophisticated player.  We 
refer to this as strategic teaching.  
Strategic teaching goes on all the time in business.  For example, Wall Street security 
analysts tend to hammer the share price of a company that reports disappointing earnings--below 
what was expected. Managers have an incentive to manipulate expectations for earnings as best 
they can (using accounting methods to keep some potential earnings “in their pocket”). They are 
effectively trying to teach the Street that earnings will be low so analysts will be pleasantly 
surprised when the earnings come out higher. 
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In this process, it is important to understand what a rival is learning from your teaching to 
avoid teaching too much or too little. Think about a supplier trying to reassure a new client of its 
goodwill by providing extra goods, lowest-price guarantees, and so forth. Some clients will easily 
learn that the supplier is trustworthy, so repeated concessions to establish trust are a waste of 
money (the supplier is over-teaching). Other clients will never quite trust the supplier, so it may be 
better to sever the relationship. The EWA model offers a way to quantify what another firm or 
person is learning from the current  strategy.  
There are many other important potential applications of the idea of optimal teaching. In 
economics, it is well-established that a spurt of unexpected inflation can lower unemployment (this 
is called the Phillips curve). As a result, policy makers who benefit from lower unemployment--
such as a sitting administration just before a presidential election-- are always tempted to increase 
inflation. Policy makers who take a long view--such as a Federal Reserve Board chairman with a 
long-term perspective --would like to build up credibility with the public by keeping price inflation 
low for years at a time. This certifies his ability to resist the temptation to inflate. In our terms, the 
policy makers have an incentive to teach the public that inflation will be low in the future.  This 
basic idea has been used to explain the substantial shift from the high double-digit inflation of the 
1970s in the U.S., to a more recent post-1985 drop in inflation.9  
Another example is pricing of goods that fall in price rapidly, such as computers and new 
high-tech products like cellular phones and personal digital assistants. In these markets, consumers 
may delay purchase if they believe prices will fall rapidly. Since firms would like to sell goods 
earlier rather than later, they have an incentive to teach consumers that prices will not fall that 
rapidly, so they will buy right away.  
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The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
A sophisticated player who is teaching other players may even deliberately choose a bad strategy in 
the current period, if choosing that strategy yields a better return in future periods. In a sense, the 
current period choice is an “investment” in educating the other players, which pays off for the 
teacher in the future. To explore this, consider the well-known example of the repeated prisoners' 
dilemma.  
 In the prisoners’ dilemma, two prisoners are arrested. They have the choice of either 
cooperating with one another or defecting and ratting on the other.  If they cooperate, they each 
receive an equal payoff of 3, as shown in Table 9.1.  If one defects and other doesn’t, however, the 
defector is then rewarded with a payoff of 5 while the betrayed partner is left with zero.   If both 
defect, then they both end up with 1.  The dilemma is that both players can do better if they 
cooperate. But if they cannot be sure what the other player will do, they are better off defecting. At 
least that guarantees a payoff of 1 and perhaps of 5. 
 
Table 9.1: Prisoners’ Dilemma Payoffs 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 3,3 0,5 
Defect 5,0 1,1 
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In the repeated prisoners’ dilemma, players engage in this same game over several sessions.  
Players usually cooperate in the initial periods. Then one of the players defects as the end draws 
near, and both players defect until the last round. How can we explain this?  
 Strategic teaching explains it by assuming that some players are adaptive, and learn, while 
others are sophisticated and try to teach the adaptive players to cooperate. If the teachers can 
convince the adaptive learners to cooperate, then everybody can get payoffs of 3 for several 
periods.  
 How does the teaching work? The sophisticated player starts by cooperating, choosing a 
strategy that maximizes the sum of the current payoff and expected future payoffs (assuming the 
adaptive players learn from what the sophisticated players do in the beginning). Suppose the 
adaptive players start out with equal initial attractions on cooperating and defecting, so they are 
equally likely to choose either one.  If the adaptive students choose to defect, they earn  
5, and are likely to continue to defect in the future. 
 Anticipating this, the sophisticated teacher may well give up, and both players defect 
throughout. More interestingly, suppose the adaptive player starts by choosing to cooperate.  Then 
both players earn a payoff of 3, but also reinforces defection  (since they know they would have 
earned 5 if one had defected).   Thus, strategic teaching can explain why there is mutual 
cooperation for several periods in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma. But how does it explain the fact 
that cooperation usually breaks down a couple of periods from the end?  Remember that 
sophisticated teachers maximize the sum of their current payoff and expected future payoffs 
(knowing how their current actions “teach” the adaptive players).  When the end draws near, there 
are not many future periods of cooperative payoffs left, and the strategic teachers are tempted to 
defect to earn the largest payoff of 5. How likely adaptive players are to switch to defect will 
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depend on the amount of cooperation they encountered previously.  Thus, it pays for sophisticated 
teachers to cooperate until close to the end, to build up the chance that an adaptive player will still 
cooperate in the last period (even after a defection), and to defect a couple periods before the end.  
Strategic teaching is sometimes beneficial for both players--as when one firm tries to 
reassure a business partner, who learns from the firm's past behavior that it can be trusted in the 
future and that trust enables the two sides to do business profitably.  In other cases strategic 
teaching benefits the “teacher” by enabling the teacher to exploit or manipulate the “student” who 
is learning. Examples include developing a reputation for aggressively pricing when there is new 
competition.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
An important component of good strategic advice is a theory of learning. Learning is important 
because in many naturally occurring strategic situations players do not know their payoffs at all; 
therefore they can learn more from experience than from deduction and calculation.  Understanding 
how others learn also is important because sophisticated players who know how others learn can 
stay a step ahead of them.  Sophisticated players  can teach others what to expect in the future, in a 
way that often benefits the teacher.  
 Since its discovery about fifty years ago, game theory has been hailed as the mathematical 
language for analyzing social situations. Unfortunately, an obsession with mathematical details of 
how rational players would play a game after careful introspection have kept game theorists from 
tackling the more practically useful question--how do people actually play? And  knowing that, 
how should people play? The EWA theory was created because other learning theories left out 
important pieces of this puzzle. We also had a nagging sense that the two most prominent kinds of  
learning--learning by reinforcement of successful strategies, and learning by forming beliefs about 
other players' behavior and responding to them--might have something fundamental in common. 
Furthermore, we know statistically from analysis of 31 experimental data sets that leaving out any 
of the three learning-style features (consideration, change and commitment) falls short in 
explaining how people actually learn.   
 
Implications 
 What are the implications of this theory for managers? In any competitive interaction, look 
for opportunities to teach and to learn from the situation. Game theory can help think through the 
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dynamics of multiple rounds of  interactions.  Don’t just look at the impact of poor choices but also 
consider the impact of regrets over choices that were not taken.   
 
• Learn how to learn:  As you become more sophisticated in your learning you will better be 
able to make your own decisions and outguess your competitors.  Understand how the three 
factors of consideration, change and commitment affect learning. For any given decision, 
identify how these factors will influence your learning about it and decide on what learning 
style is best.  Considering the opportunity costs of all strategies you have not tried is generally 
wise.  Applying a low change index is smart when the world is changing rapidly, but drawing 
on a large span of experience (i.e., a high change index) is smart when the world is relatively 
stable. Committing strongly to a particular strategy is wise only if you become convinced from 
its string of successes that no other strategy is likely to prove better.  
 
• Understand learning patterns of others: Knowing how competitors respond to experience 
enables firms, in principle, to stay one step ahead. Recent evidence from academic studies of 
financial markets shows that investors tend to underreact to certain kinds of events in the short 
run, and overreact in the long run. These patterns open up the possibility that a theory of how 
investors learn could enable investment managers to beat the market.10 
 
• Assess the sophistication of other players:  Determining whether other players are 
sophisticated or not offers insights into the strategies you should take with them.  If players are 
unsophisticated, how can you use teaching strategies to “educate” them in the direction you 
want to go?  
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• Try using a statistical model: While we have left out the mathematical details of the EWA 
theory, applying it statistically may improve a firm’s ability to forecast learning of others. Many 
statistical models are used in business, like the Black-Scholes options pricing formula (and 
many subtle versions of it), models forecasting consumer purchases, and models forecasting 
interest rates and other macroeconomic variables.  These models are successful because they 
combine variables in very precise ways, which sharpen managerial intuition.  A variant of the 
EWA theory was applied by one of us (Ho) and Kuan Chong11 to predict consumer choices of 
ice cream, diapers,and other consumer products. The theory assumes that people learn what 
brands they like by trial and error and generalize from experience with one brand to related 
brands which are similar. The analysis used 130,000 choices by consumers, and was able to 
predict choices about 10 percent better using only one-fifth as many variables as the previous 
"best practice" model. (Ten percent is a small improvement, but in consumer forecasting even a 
1% increase adds lots of value.) A large supermarket chain rushed the model into their business 
immediately (before Ho and Chong's paper was even published in a journal!).  
 
 Learning has become a central focus of organizations. But less attention has been spent on 
the process by which people learn – particularly from their own experience and that of others.  The 
EWA learning theory is a powerful tool for strategic decision making for two reasons:  First, it 
enables a company to stay a step ahead of competitors by predicting what they will do.  Second, it 
enables a company to teach competitors how the company will behave in the future, which is useful 
for both creating trust among partners, and signaling toughness to competitors.  
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NOTES 
                                                          
1 Define the attraction for strategy j, after period t’s experience is incorporated, as Aj(t), and define the payoff from 
strategy j in period t to be •(j,t). In the EWA theory, attractions are modified each period according to the formula, 
Aj(t)=(•Aj(t-1)+•(j,t).)/(•(1-•)+1), if strategy j was chosen in period t, or Aj(t)=(•Aj(t-1)+••(j,t))/(•(1-•)+1), if strategy 
j was not chosen.  Attractions are then used to determine the chance of playing a particular strategy through an 
exponential “logit” formula. See Camerer and Ho (1999) for more details. The parameter • is the change index, • is the 
consideration (or imagination) index, and • is the commitment index. 
2  
3 Reinforcement learning and belief-based learning are thus closely interrelated: belief learning is a kind of general 
reinforcement in which even unchosen strategies are strongly reinforced by what they would have earned. This 
surprising kinship came as a shock to theorists who had thought the two kinds of learning were fundamentally 
unrelated, like adventurers discovering that two wide rivers in different parts of a country spring from a common 
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